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ABSTRACT  
 
Moral psychologists disagree over whether descriptively different moral violations represent 
distinct cognitive domains or are in fact unified by common cognitive mechanisms. The Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT; Haidt, 2007) offers five different domains of moral transgressions: 
Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. Both 
intentionality and omission bias (e.g. omissions such as letting someone die being judged less 
harshly than actions such as killing someone) have been shown to impact moral judgments; 
however, it remains unclear how these rules modulate judgments across moral transgressions of 
various types. Here, we investigate the role of intentionality and omission bias across different 
moral violations to determine if the divide between moral domains represent true cognitive, (as 
opposed to descriptive), differences. We utilized a 2 x 2 x 5 design to create stories across the 5 
domains posited by MFT that were intentional/accidental cases of actions/omissions. 
Importantly, this study also looks at four distinct moral judgments of wrongness, responsibility, 
blameworthiness, and punishment to assess the role of these rules across judgments. We found 
that intent and action play different roles across judgments, particularly when comparing 
wrongness and punishment. Intent seems to matter more for wrongness, whereas action matters 
more for punishment. Further, these rules also differ across domains. We found that intent 
matters more for the individualizing foundations of harm and fairness (versus the binding 
foundations of ingroup, authority, and purity) in judgments of wrongness and punishment. The 
difference between action and omission is also more important for the individualizing 
foundations for punishment. These data suggest intentionality and omission bias manifest 
themselves uniquely across moral judgments and domains and provide evidence that there are 
meaningful differences between domains. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Morality: One thing or many things? 
 
There is an ongoing debate in moral psychology over the foundations of morality. As 
morality is an incredibly abstract concept that appears to vary greatly across cultures and 
individuals, psychologists have worked to unify morality in concrete, measurable ways that can 
be scientifically studied. Moral psychologists have debated over the basis of moral 
transgressions, providing support for several theories and models in an attempt to better 
understand morality as a whole. The fundamental question remains: Is morality one thing or 
many things (Dungan & Young, in press)? Are there no common unifying components 
underlying the seemingly limitless amount of moral transgressions or do philosophers like Kant 
and his categorical imperative of universality tell the correct story?  
Although the details of moral transgressions vary substantially, Gray et al. (2012) 
represent the argument of morality as one thing. They propose that the moral dyad of harm 
between an agent and a patient is the fundamental component underlying and unifying all of 
morality. Gray et al. (2012) suggest that all moral transgressions can be reduced to this moral 
dyad of an “intentional agent and suffering patient”, and this model then operates as a major top-
down influence in the perception and judgment of moral transgressions and serves as the 
foundation for the rest of morality. Even in cases where the two roles of the moral dyad are not 
explicit or the harm is somewhat ambiguous, there is still an implicit perception of suffering 
caused intentionally by another as a result of the powerful top-down influence exerted by the 
moral dyad. Gray et al. (2012) demonstrate that the moral dyad simply provides a rough form or 
outline of intentional harm and suffering between two figures, but the specific content of each 
dyad, as evidenced by the variety of moral transgressions within our world, is highly variable.  
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In contrast, others have argued that the moral dyad is a far too limited, simplistic view of 
morality. When we observe the world, morality is in fact much more complex and cannot be 
contained by one, unifying component, but instead should be represented as many things. 
Graham et al. (2009, 2011) have supported what is known as the Moral Foundations Theory, or 
that moral transgressions cannot be limited to harm within this dyad, but instead span across five 
distinct moral domains of Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, 
and Purity/Sanctity. This theory would argue, for example, that shooting someone (a harm 
violation) is perceived and judged psychologically differently than incest (a purity violation). 
This research has helped to delineate the variability of moral transgressions as falling into these 
five domains and supports that moral cognition relies on several processes. Further, it seems that 
individual, cultural, and political differences might strongly influence the prioritization and 
endorsement of these moral domains, and previous research has demonstrated how varying 
beliefs affect our moral judgments. Graham et al. (2009) explained that certain domains, 
specifically harm and fairness, are emphasized in society to protect the rights of individuals. On 
the other hand, domains of ingroup, authority and purity emphasize the importance of groups and 
bind individuals to others and to duties and expectations in order to maintain societal stability 
and minimize divergence from norms. Consequently, harm and fairness have been categorized as 
the “individualizing foundations” because the individual is the center of moral value while 
ingroup, authority, and purity are known as the “binding foundations” because they emphasize 
the group as the center of morality (Graham et al., 2009). 
The dimensions versus domains argument (morality as one thing versus morality as many 
things) can be addressed by applying certain rules across these descriptively distinct domains 
(Dungan & Young, in press). The way in which these rules manifest themselves across domains 
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would further our understanding of moral cognition by lending support to theories on the 
foundations of morality. The Moral Dyad Theory would predict that these rules would not differ 
across moral transgressions because all moral judgments rely on one cognitive process. 
Reversely, the Moral Foundations Theory would predict that these rules should behave 
differently across domains because morality involves many distinct cognitive processes. If the 
application of rules across domains differs significantly, then these cognitive boundaries must 
not be solely theoretical, but might actually exist within moral cognition. 
Intentionality and the Omission Bias 
There are certain rules that seem to exert powerful influence over our moral judgments 
that perhaps can be used in determining whether the moral domains of harm, fairness, ingroup, 
authority, and purity represent true, psychologically meaningful boundaries. There are specific 
elements of reasoning about others that, when interpreted in a moral context, tend to impact our 
judgments in a consistent manner. Intuitively, people routinely judge accidental harm less 
harshly than intentional harm (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). This finding suggests that the 
perception of others’ mental states, especially intentionality, plays a decisive role in our moral 
judgments. However, the actual outcomes of events also influence our judgments, as there exists 
an outcome bias and even accidents are slightly judged (Young & Saxe, 2011). Furthermore, 
previous research has shown that when action, causation, and intention are varied, judgments of 
wrongness, permissibility, punishment and blame also shift (Cushman, 2008; DeScioli et al., 
2011). It appears that judgments of wrongness and permissibility rely heavily on the perceived 
mental states of the agent, such as intention, whereas punishment depends more on the actual 
outcome of the event (Cushman, 2008). When making judgments of others in real-life cases of 
transgressions, different kinds of moral judgments frequently split. One example that comes 
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readily to mind is the distinction between wrongness and punishment for two separate drunk 
driving incidents  (Cushman, in press). While driving drunk, Person A steers off the road and hits 
a tree, while Person B drives onto the sidewalk and hits a pedestrian. Judgments of wrongness 
for both characters will be relatively equal, but judgments of punishment will likely differ 
substantially based on the outcome. 
Additionally, the means of achieving a particular outcome, or the way in which an agent 
commits an action, also influences the severity of moral judgments. Specifically, there seems to 
exist a robust omission bias in moral judgments such that transgressions of omission (ex. the 
doctor who let the terminally ill patient die) are judged as less morally wrong than transgressions 
of action (ex. the doctor who killed the terminally ill patient), even when intentions are held 
constant (DeScioli et al., 2011). Intentionality and the omission effect serve as key contributors 
to our ultimate moral judgments, and are basic to the processes involved in judging others. The 
intentional/accidental distinction seems more intuitive, but why exactly are omissions judged less 
harshly than actions? The action/omission distinction is thought to impact moral judgments via 
causal attribution such that in the case of the action, the agent is mentally more connected to the 
harm itself (Cushman & Young, 2011). This omission bias, also called the Doctrine of Doing and 
Allowing in philosophy, has been well documented in previous research. One experiment by 
DeScioli et al. (2011) involved an economic game between a “taker” and an “owner” in which 
the taker could choose to allocate the owner’s $1 between the two roles in one of four different 
allotments. One of these options was an omission-like response in that if the taker did not 
respond within a designated amount of time, they would receive $0.85 and the owner would be 
left with $0.00 (the taker was penalized $0.15 for letting the time run out). The inaction of the 
taker in not responding was considered an omission. DeScioli et al. (2011) demonstrated that 
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when punishment from a third-party observer was possible, the percentage of omission responses 
increased significantly from the no-punishment condition. Researchers inferred that less harsh 
denunciation from others exerts a powerful influence on people’s behavior to choose omissions 
rather than actions. These findings suggest that the preference for omission when committing a 
moral transgression or wrongdoing is more of a strategy, to avoid condemnation and punishment 
from others, than a bias.  
Likewise, in a separate study, participants were presented with hypothetical scenarios in 
which they had the opportunity to choose whether or not to save victims from building 
detonations (DeScioli et al., 2011). They found that subjects were more likely to choose 
omission when there was less observable and less tangible evidence for this wrongdoing. 
However, when physical evidence could be observed for an omission, cases in which participants 
had to select to “opt out” of rescuing the victims from the detonations by pressing a button, the 
bias for omission disappeared because this omission choice was judged just as harshly as 
choosing directly to cause death to the victims. DeScioli et al. (2011) reasoned that the tendency 
to favor omission is because, in comparison to moral transgressions of action, omissions leave 
much less material evidence behind and therefore cause a reduction in the severity of moral 
judgments of others.  
Taken together, this research provides evidence that both omissions and intentions seem 
to exercise immense influence on our moral judgments, in spite of there being nothing 
intrinsically moral about these two elements. One could intentionally or accidentally wear a blue 
shirt on a particular day, but this action is non-moral. Similarly, an agent could omit or commit 
to the same non-moral outcome. Both intentionality and omission are not necessarily tied to 
morality, yet they are frequently interpreted in a moral context and involved in the processes of 
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moral cognition. The distinction between intentional/accidental and action/omission seem to 
reliably predict moral judgments. The influence of non-moral elements like intentions and 
omissions is best demonstrated when the transgression being judged is within the harm domain. 
However, it remains unclear how our moral judgments of omission versus action and intentional 
versus accidental transgressions vary across all five of the moral domains. The research 
discussed above has led us to our present research questions. If these descriptively distinct moral 
domains of harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity are true, how do non-moral elements 
such as intentionality and omission modulate moral judgments, and do they influence these 
judgments equally or are they weighted more heavily within certain domains? Do these 
authorities effectively constitute universal “rules” for morality or do they differ in their influence 
across moral domains?  
Previous evidence suggests that the binding domains, specifically purity, may be far less 
flexible than the harm domain when making moral judgments because people do not consider 
intentionality to the same extent when judging violations of purity. Russell & Giner-Sorolla 
(2011) investigated which emotions respond to various types of moral transgressions and found 
that anger responds to harm and intentionality such that much less anger is elicited when judging 
accidental harm in comparison to intentional harm and judgments are less harsh. In contrast, 
disgust uniquely responds to violations pertaining to bodily norms and does not respond to 
intentionality, but only to whether or not the bodily norm violation actually occurred. Thus, 
accidental and intentional incest will both elicit disgust (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). In 
comparing harm and purity, Young & Saxe (2011) found that accidental harms are judged as 
significantly less morally wrong than accidental incest. Taken together, these data provide 
powerful evidence that intentionality plays a much smaller role in moral judgments of purity 
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violations than harm. Similarly, although the role of the omission bias across moral domains is 
less clear than intentionality, there is some evidence that it too matters less for purity. DeScioli et 
al. (2012) found that although the omission effect was observable in wrongness ratings across 
many different kinds of violations, the omission-action difference was smaller for sex-related 
offenses, which suggest that the bias might be enhanced for the individualizing domains and 
diminished for purity. Additionally, Haidt & Baron (1996) demonstrated that social contexts 
impact the influence of omissions on our moral judgments; the action-omission difference is 
diminished when judging others in close relationships involving higher role responsibility like 
authority and loyalty. In these cases, judgments are more outcome-based, but the preference for 
omissions is more pronounced in judgments of others perceived in lower-responsibility roles 
(Haidt & Baron, 1996). In summary, the flexibility of our judgments and the extent to which 
non-moral factors such as intentionality and the omission bias play a role in these judgments 
seem to vary across the five moral domains. 
Present Study  
Given the many factors influencing moral cognition, it remains unclear how intentionality 
and the omission bias interact with the moral domains, different moral judgments, and each 
other. The present study investigates the role of these two non-moral elements across the moral 
domains of harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity and judgments of wrongness, 
responsibility, blameworthiness, and punishment. By applying intentions and omissions across 
the descriptively distinct moral domains, this experiment addresses the question of dimensions 
versus domains. If morality is one thing, we expect intentionality and the omission bias to 
operate similarly across domains. But if these domains represent true cognitive distinctions, then 
we expect these rules to operate differently across domains. We also predict to replicate biases of 
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intentionality and omission, and we expect that these rules will vary across the four moral 
judgments of wrongness, blame, punishment, and responsibility.  
 
METHODS: 
 
Participants 
The participants in this experiment were all undergraduate students at Boston College 
who were recruited from the SONA program sign-ups and participated in the experiment to 
satisfy a course requirement or for a payment of $5. A total of 54 participants were tested (10 
male and 44 female). The data from four participants were thrown out due to an error in 
counterbalancing, leaving a total of 50 participants’ data for analysis (9 male and 41 female). All 
subjects were notified that they could back out of the experiment at any time, signed a consent 
form before the experiment, and were debriefed after the experiment in accordance with the 
Internal Review Board at Boston College.  
Stimuli  
This study used a 5 (domains) x 2 (intentional/accidental) x 2 (action/omission) x 4 
(judgments) stimuli design. We created stories about moral transgressions spanning the five 
domains. There were a total of twenty stories, four stories for each domain. An example of a 
harm transgression is John causing Ivan to have an allergic reaction, while a purity example is 
Eric having cyber sex with his sister (see Appendix I for the full stimuli set). The stories varied 
in intentionality of the agent (e.g. John knew about Ivan’s allergy versus John didn’t know) and 
in the action/omission of the agent (e.g. John told Ivan to eat the salad versus John did not say 
anything when Ivan ate the salad). Each story had four different possible endings that indicated 
the intentionality of the agent and the means of arriving at the outcome: intentional action, 
accidental action, intentional omission, and accidental omission.  
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Participants received only one of these endings for each story, but throughout the study, 
each participant received one of all four ending types for the five moral domains. Story order and 
endings were pseudo-randomized across participants. After each story, participants completed a 
series of four judgments (wrongness, responsibility, blameworthiness, and punishment) about the 
agent in the story. The order in which participants received these judgments was randomized 
across participants, but one particular participant received the four judgments in the exact same 
order for all twenty stories.  
Before beginning this study, we also conducted a stimuli validation pretest and used 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to collect data from 622 participants. Participants received one story 
from a single domain and completed a series of judgments about the transgression. All 
participants were presented with the intentional action ending of the stimuli used in the present 
study. To ensure that the stories were being perceived within the intended domain, participants 
completed judgments pertaining to the five moral domains and were asked the following 
questions on a scale from 1 to 7: How harmful? How unfair? How disloyal? How disrespectful? 
How disgusting? How wrong? We also wanted to ensure that the stories did not differ 
substantially in overall wrongness. After collecting the data, we eliminated participants with no 
variability in their responses and then analyzed how each story was rated. Based on this 
feedback, some minor changes were made to the stimuli in order to minimize domain overlap. 
We additionally sought to make all of the stories roughly the same in length and maintained 
equal distribution of intention verbs (e.g. to know, to notice, to see) across domains. 
Procedure  
This study utilized a completely within-subject design. Participants came into lab and, 
after consenting, were asked to complete two computer tasks. The first task was completed 
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within PsychToolBox on MATLAB.  The participants were asked to read a series of twenty short 
stories about a particular person’s behavior, actions, or interaction with another person. After 
each story, the participants were asked to make a series of four judgments about the agent in the 
story. The following questions appeared in the same sequence after each story and the order of 
the questions was randomized across participants: How morally wrong is this person? How 
responsible is this person for what occurred? How blameworthy is this person? How much 
should this person be punished for what happened? All questions were answered on a seven-
point Likert scale, 1 being not at all and 7 being very much. The subsequent judgment question 
appeared on screen only after the participant responded, and the next story appeared after the 
participant completed all four judgments for the previous story.  
I.              II.  
    
III.             IV. 
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V. 
 
 
After completing all four judgments for each of the twenty stories, participants were then 
asked to complete a second computer task involving a short survey on Qualtrics. This survey 
collected information on demographics as well as political beliefs and orientation. In addition to 
their age and gender, participants were asked, “What best describes your political beliefs” and 
responded in three different ways on a scale from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative): In 
general, I am; When it comes to social issues, I am; When it comes to economic issues, I am. 
Within this survey, participants also completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ, 
Graham et al., 2011; Appendix II) to determine the importance of the different moral domains of 
harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity to their moral-decision making process. The first 
part of the MFQ asked participants to rate on a scale from 0 to 5 how relevant different factors, 
relating to the moral domains, are to their judgments of right and wrong. Some examples include 
“Whether or not someone suffered emotionally” and “Whether or not someone violated 
standards of purity and decency”. In the second section of the MFQ, participants were asked to 
rate their agreement with various statements on a scale from 0 to 5. Statements included 
“Respect for authority is something all children need to learn”, “One of the worst things a person 
could do is hurt a defenseless animal”, “People should be loyal to their family members, even 
when they have done something wrong”, and “It can never be right to kill a human being.”   
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In the final part of the survey, participants completed the Action/Outcome Scale (Miller 
et al., in press; Appendix III) that assessed how upsetting various actions, outcomes, and control 
items were to participants if they were in those particular situations. Participants were always 
asked, “How much would it upset you to…?” and responded on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much so). Action items included, “How much would it upset you to hold an empty gun that 
both you and your friend know is empty to your friend’s head and pull the trigger?”, and “How 
much would it upset you to stab a fellow actor in the neck during a play using a stage knife with 
a retractable blade?”. Some examples of outcome items were “How much would it upset you to 
see a stranger fall down the stairs?” and “How much would it upset you to listen to somebody 
have a tooth pulled when there is no anesthetic available?”. After finishing the Action/Outcome 
Scale, the survey was completed and the experiment ended. (We do not analyze the MFQ or 
Action/Outcome Scale in this paper, but there are hypotheses for when and why they would be 
important to measure; see Graham et al., 2011; Miller et al., in press). The computer tasks were 
followed by a short debriefing session in which participants were told more about the purpose of 
the study and could ask any questions. Because there was no time limit, participants took as long 
as they needed to complete the entire study. The experiment typically lasted between 20 and 30 
minutes.  
 
RESULTS: A JUDGMENT DIFFERENCE 
 
All data and statistical analyses were conducted using Microsoft Excel and SPSS. Reported 
means are subtractions (e.g. mean intentional transgressions – mean accidental transgressions).  
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The Role of Intent and Action across Judgments 
Consisted with previous research (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011), participants rated 
intentional transgressions as worse than accidental ones (M = 2.654, SD = .953, t(49) = 19.695, p 
< .001) and actions worse than omissions (M = .598, SD = .569, t(49)= 7.434, p < .001). 
However, intentionality and the omission bias differed across the four judgments of wrongness, 
blame, punishment, and responsibility (Fig. 1). To look at the role of intent and action across 
judgments, we subtracted ratings of accidental transgressions from intentional ones and 
omissions from actions respectively. A 4 (Judgments) x 2 (Intent/Action) ANOVA showed a 
main effect of judgments (F(3, 147) = 8.926, p < .001, partial eta squared = .154) and a main 
effect of intent/action (F(1,49) = 183.258, p < .001, partial eta squared = .789) such that the 
difference between intentional and accidental transgressions was higher than the difference 
between actions and omissions for all four judgments. There also was a significant interaction 
between judgments and intent/action (F(3,147) = 28.031, p < .001, partial eta squared = .364) 
such that the difference between the role of intent and action differed significantly across 
judgments, intent mattering most for wrongness and action mattering most for responsibility.  
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Figure 1: Mean ratings of the difference between intentional and accidental transgressions and 
the difference between actions and omissions across four moral judgments. 
 
Paired t-tests showed that the role of intent between wrongness and blame differed 
significantly (M = .454, SD = 1.122, t(49)= 2.862, p <.01), as well as the role of intent between 
blame and punishment (M = .360, SD = .701, t(49) = 3.631, p = .001) and punishment and 
responsibility (M = .262, SD = .727, t(49) = 2.548, p < .05). The role of action between 
wrongness and punishment also differed significantly (M = -.182, SD = .542, t(49) = -2.374, p < 
.05), as well as between blame and responsibility (M = -.254, SD = .564, t(49) = -3.183, p < .01). 
These data suggest that intentionality and the omission bias play distinct roles in different moral 
judgments.  
A Comparison of Judgments: Wrongness versus Punishment 
 
Judgments of wrongness and punishment frequently diverge when judging the 
transgressions of others, so we wanted to focus on these two judgments in our analyses. A 
critical difference emerged in the role of intent and action across wrongness and punishment. In a 
2 (Wrongness/Punishment) x 2 (Intent/Action) ANOVA, there was a main effect of intent, such 
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that intent was rated higher than action for both judgment types (F(1,49) = 211.171, p < .001,  
partial eta squared = .812). Surprisingly, there was also a main effect of judgment, such that 
wrongness judgments were rated higher than punishment judgments (F(1,49) = 16.066, p < .001, 
partial eta squared = .247). Additionally, there was a significant interaction between Judgments 
and Intent/Action, such that intent mattered more for wrongness and less for punishment, and 
action mattered more for punishment and less for wrongness (F(1,49) = 45.379, p < .001,  partial 
eta squared = .481). A 2 (Wrongness/Punishment) x 2 (Intentional/Accidental) ANOVA showed 
that this effect was driven by intentional transgressions being rated as more wrong than 
punishable, and accidental transgressions being rated as more punishable than wrong (significant 
interaction between judgments and intentional/accidental, F(1,49) = 37.893, p < .001, partial eta 
squared = .436). The difference in the role of action between wrongness and punishment was 
driven by a significant interaction between judgments and action/omission (F(1,49) = 5.638, p < 
.05, partial eta squared = .103) in a 2 (Wrongness/Punishment) x 2 (Action/Omission) ANOVA. 
While omissions did not vary across judgments, actions were rated as more punishable than 
wrong.  
a)  b)  
Figure 2: a) Mean ratings of intentionality for wrongness and punishment and b) the omission 
bias.  
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We additionally ran a 2 (Wrongness/Punishment) x 2 (Action/Omission) x 2 
(Intentional/Accidental) ANOVA in which there were main effects of action/omission (F(1,49) = 
36.882, p < .001, partial eta squared = .429) and intentional/accidental (F(1,49) = 476.481, p < 
.001, partial eta squared = .907). There was a significant interaction between judgments and 
action/omission (F(1,49) = 5.638, p < .05, partial eta squared = .103) and between judgments and 
intentional/accidental (F(1,49) = 37.893, p < .001, partial eta squared = .436). 
 
 
Figure 3: Mean ratings of the four story endings for judgments of wrongness and punishment. 
 
 
RESULTS: A DOMAIN DIFFERENCE  
 
The Role of Intent across Domains 
 
In order to further investigate the role of intent in making moral judgments, we again ran 
analyses on the intentional – accidental subtraction, but with the additional component of 
domains. Collapsing across the individualizing (harm and fairness) and binding (ingroup, 
authority, and purity) foundations (Graham et al., 2009), we found that intent matters more for 
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the individualizing than binding foundations in judgments of wrongness (M = .858, SD = 1.155, 
t(49)= 5.255, p < .001) and punishment (M = .698, SD = 1.371, t(49) = 3.602, p = .001). This 
difference was non-significant for both responsibility and blame (p’s > .05). A 2 (Wrongness, 
Punishment) x 2 (Individualizing, Binding) ANOVA for the role of intent revealed that the 
interaction between judgments and individualizing/binding was non-significant (p > .05).  
 
 
Figure 4: Mean ratings of the role of intent (intentional – accidental transgressions) across 
individualizing and binding foundations for judgments of wrongness and punishment.   
 
 We then separated the individualizing and binding foundations to look at the difference 
between intentional and accidental transgressions across the five moral domains of harm, 
fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity. The role of intent differed across domains, but this 
difference was less clear and interpretable as the individualizing/binding distinction. When 
collapsing across judgments, intent seems to matter more for harm than for any other domain. 
The role of intent for harm was significantly higher than fairness (M = 1.020, SD = 1.856, t(49) 
= 3.886, p < .001), ingroup (M = .928, SD = 1.994, t(49) = 3.289, p < .01), authority (M = .923, 
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SD = 1.285, t(49)= 5.076, p < .001), and purity (M = 1.135, SD = 1.671, t(49) = 4.803, p < .001). 
Interestingly, the role of intent for the other four domains did not differ significantly.  
 
 
Figure 5: Mean ratings of the role of intent (intentional – accidental transgressions) across MFT 
domains collapsed across the four moral judgments.  
 
Next, we investigated the role of intent across domains with the additional component of 
judgments, looking at wrongness, punishment, blame, and responsibility separately. (Again, we 
focused on the wrongness versus punishment contrast, but see Supplementary Results for further 
details).  The meaning of the difference between intentional and accidental transgressions across 
domains for individual moral judgments is not clear, but wrongness was most consistent with 
previous research (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011; Graham et al., 2009). Paired t-tests revealed 
that the role of intent significantly differed between the domains of harm and ingroup (M = .730, 
SD = 1.709, t(49) = 3.02, p < .01), harm and authority (M = .770, SD = 1.461, t(49) = 3.726, p = 
.001), and harm and purity (M = 1.90, SD = 2.541, t(49) = 5.286, p < .001) were significant for 
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wrongness. There were also significant differences between fairness and purity (M = 1.35, SD = 
2.642, t(49) = 3.613, p = .001), ingroup and purity (M = 1.17, SD = 2.965, t(49) = 2.790, p < 
.01), and authority and purity (M = 1.13, SD = 2.379, t(49) = 3.358, p < .01) were also 
significant. These data fit nicely with the findings of Russell & Giner-Sorolla (2011) that harm 
and purity respond uniquely to intentionality and that purity the less flexible domain. They also 
demonstrate the distinction in the role of intent between the individualizing and binding 
foundations, though this distinction is not very clear because fairness looks like ingroup and 
authority. 
 
 
Figure 6: Mean ratings of the role of intent (intentional – accidental transgressions) across MFT 
domains for wrongness.  
 
For punishment, fairness stories were judged similarly to binding foundations rather than 
harm, the other individualizing foundation. This finding is not what a strict individualizing 
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versus binding distinction would expect. The role of intent significantly differed between harm 
and fairness (M = 1.290, SD = 2.204, t(49)= 4.139, p < .001), harm and ingroup (M = 1.260, SD 
= 2.291, t(49) = 3.889, p < .001), harm and authority (M = 1.130, SD = 2.000, t = 3.996, p < 
.001), and harm and purity (M = 1.640, SD = 2.321, t(49) = 4.996, p < .001). Thus, the role of 
intent was most important to harm than any other domain, a similar trend to the role of intent 
when collapsed across the four judgments.  
 
 
Figure 7: Mean ratings of the role of intent (intentional – accidental transgressions) across MFT 
domains for punishment. 
 
 
The Role of Action across Domains 
Similarly, we looked at the role of action across moral domains by testing the action – 
omission subtraction. First, we collapsed the five domains into the individualizing and binding 
foundations. When judging how much punishment someone deserves, the omission bias was 
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greater for the individualizing (harm and fairness) than binding foundations (M = .365, SD = 
1.286, t(49) = 2.007, p = .050). This difference was not significant for judgments of wrongness, 
blame, and responsibility (p’s < .05). A 2 (Wrongness, Punishment) x 2 (Individualizing, 
Binding) ANOVA for the role of action revealed a significant interaction between judgments and 
individualizing/binding (F(1,49), p < .05, partial eta squared = .090).  
 
Figure 8: Mean ratings of the role of action (actions – omissions) across individualizing and 
binding foundations for judgments of wrongness and punishment.   
 
We also tested the role of intent across domains. Like the role of intent, the role of action 
mattered most for the harm domain when collapsed across judgments. The role of action for 
harm differed significantly from fairness (M = .530, SD = 1.680, t(49) = 2.231, p < .05), 
authority (M = .603, SD = 1.214, t(49) = 3.508, p = .001), and purity (M = .465, SD = 1.453, 
t(49) = 2.262, p < .05). The other four domains did not differentiate from each other (p’s > .05). 
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Figure 9: Mean ratings of the role of action (actions – omissions) across MFT domains collapsed 
across the four moral judgments.  
 
Then, we broke the above test down to investigate the role of action across domains 
adding in the variable of moral judgments. For wrongness, the action – omission subtraction 
differed significantly between harm and authority (M = .630, SD = 1.662, t(49) = 2.680, p = .01), 
fairness and purity (marginally significant, M = -.830, SD = 2.944, t(49) = -1.993, p=.052), 
ingroup and purity (M = -.770, SD = 2.155, t(49) = -2.526, p < .05), and authority and purity (M 
= -.930, SD = 2.759, t(49) = -2.383, p < .05). It is very striking (and unexpected based on past 
research) that for the role of action for wrongness, harm and purity seem to be tracking together 
and fairness, ingroup, and authority as well (Graham et al., 2009).  
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Figure 10: Mean ratings of the role of action (actions – omissions) across MFT domains for 
wrongness. The difference between action and omission was only significant for the harm (p < 
.001) and purity (p < .01) domains. 
 
For making judgments of punishment, the role of action differed between the domains of 
harm and ingroup (M = .620, SD = 2.062, t(49) = 2.126 p < .05), and harm and authority (M = 
.770, SD = 1.519, t(49) = 3.584, p=.001). Again, it is strange that harm and purity did not 
significantly differentiate from one another and that fairness behaved more like the binding 
foundations than harm. (See Supplementary Results for the role of action across domains for 
judgments of responsibility and blame). While these data are not easily interpretable in light of 
past research (Graham et al., 2009), the omission bias and intentionality seem to be manifesting 
themselves unique across the five moral domains of MFT.  
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Figure 11: Mean ratings of the role of action (actions – omissions) across MFT domains for 
punishment. The difference between action and omission was significant for harm (p < .001), 
fairness (p < .01), ingroup (p < .05), and authority (p < .05).  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Psychologists disagree on whether morality is many things or one thing. Is there a 
unifying component underlying all of morality or does morality involve many cognitive 
processes? Here, we used rules of intent and omission to examine where differences in moral 
cognition lie. We show evidence suggesting that there are differences between the five 
descriptively distinct moral domains of harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity and that 
there may be many boundaries existing within our moral cognition of perceiving and judging 
others. Participants rated intentional transgressions as worse than accidental transgressions and 
actions worse than omissions across judgments and domains, consistent with previous research 
(Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011; DeScioli et al., 2011). However, the non-moral factors of 
intentionality and the omission bias influenced moral judgments differentially. Their influences 
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are not universal laws, but instead vary drastically depending on the domain and type of moral 
transgression being judged and the judgment being made. Particularly, there was a distinction in 
the role of intentions and omissions for judgments of wrongness and punishment such that intent 
played a larger role for wrongness and action played a larger role for punishment. There were 
also substantial differences observed in their role across all five domains. For wrongness and 
punishment, the difference between intentional and accidental transgressions was significant 
between the individualizing and binding foundations such that intentional transgressions were 
rated higher (more wrong and more punishable) for the individualizing domains. The difference 
between transgressions of action and omission was only significant between the individualizing 
and binding foundations for punishment. When broken down across the five domains, the role of 
intentionality and the omission bias was less clear, although ratings still differed across domains. 
Together, these findings suggest that intentionality and the omission bias do not influence moral 
judgments equally across domains and that the there is some truth underlying the Moral 
Foundations Theory. The five moral domains tested here do seem to represent some mechanistic 
difference in moral cognition. Many cognitive processes impact our morality, but do so uniquely 
across different kinds of moral transgressions, which suggests that these violations are distinct. 
Thus, perhaps it is more accurate to think about morality as encompassing many domains or 
foundations rather than one.  
 This study meaningfully contributes to the larger literature of moral psychology. Our 
findings relate to Graham’s et al. (2009) work demonstrating a distinction between the 
individualizing and binding foundations as representing different emphases in morality: the 
individual and the group. We too show that judgments vary across this distinction. Also, domains 
do seem to vary in their flexibility when taking into account the role of intent and action, similar 
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to the findings of Russell & Giner-Sorolla (2011) on the relationship between purity and 
intentionality. Like DeScioli et al. (2009) demonstrated, we show a robust preference for 
omissions when judging the transgressions of others. Perhaps in this study, we could have 
manipulated the difference between actions and omissions by varying the verticality of social 
roles between agents and victims (Haidt & Baron, 1996), or perhaps the relationships in our 
stories already impacted participants’ judgments.  
Intentionality and the omission bias are not the only factors that may vary across 
domains. Napier & Luguri (2013) explored the relationship between domains and abstract versus 
concrete thinking and found that when prompted to think abstractly, participants’ value of the 
individualizing foundations increased and the value of the binding foundations decreased. They 
reasoned that abstract thinking encourages people to make judgments based on their most core 
beliefs. These data suggest that controlled cognition may be associated with depreciating the 
importance of ingroup, authority, and purity when judging others. Also, there is a robust self-
other distinction in the types of violations people would rather have happen to them versus 
happen to someone else (Chakroff et al., 2013). People typically would rather have disgust-
inducing violations (purity) happen to others than themselves and would rather have harmful 
events happen to themselves than others. These discrepancies further support meaningful 
differences underlying the moral domains. While past research has focused on how morality 
differs from other types of cognition (moral versus non-moral; Young & Dungan, 2012), future 
research should continue to utilize domain-general influences, like we did with intentionality and 
the omission bias, to compare moral transgressions to each other, which will help to determine 
where true cognitive boundaries exist.  
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Limitations  
One major limitation of this study is that our data and findings are restricted to the stories 
we used in our stimuli set. This restriction could explain why the role of intentionality and the 
omission bias remains unclear across all five domains and across responsibility and 
blameworthiness, judgments that seem to fall somewhere in between wrongness and punishment. 
While we tried to minimize domain overlap as much as possible in our stimuli validation pretest, 
it is plausible that these stories were not solely perceived as transgressions within the intended 
domain and that our findings are not as domain-specific as we would like. The stimuli could 
have used more pretesting and there are many additional factors for which we could have 
controlled. There is also a substantial amount of variability across stories that we grouped under 
the same domain without accounting for these differences. For example, the purity transgressions 
included sexual acts as well as food taboos, but our analyses do not make this distinction. 
Further, we did not control for the relationships between the agent and the patient across the 
stories, which vary considerably. We also grouped our stories based on prior assumptions about 
what types of transgressions constitute a particular domain. There could be many cognitive 
mechanisms involved in moral cognition, but maybe the five moral domains tested in this study 
are not truly where the boundaries lie. Perhaps a more accurate technique for analyzing the data 
would be to run factor analyses on everything to see what stories are actually tracking together 
without imposing domain assumptions. If the stories weren’t grouping together according to 
domain, then future work using a much wider range of stimuli would be necessary to determine 
what the correct underlying structure is.  
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Future research – The Neuroscience of Moral Judgments 
 
This study does provide a solid foundation for future research and follow-up studies. 
Specifically, the behavioral data obtained from these studies can be used as groundwork for a 
functional resonance magnetic imaging (fMRI) study to look more closely at how neural 
recruitment varies across the five moral domains in making judgments of both intentional versus 
accidental and omission versus action transgressions. It remains unclear whether or not the 
recruitment of brain regions varies in making moral judgments of different domains. Certain 
structures, such as the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the right temporoparietal 
junction, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) have been shown to be involved in 
moral judgments and reasoning about the mental states of others for harm (Young & Dungan, 
2012; Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; Young et al., 2010), but less is known about neural recruitment 
for the other four moral domains. An event-related potential (ERP) study measured the 
electrophysiological response changes to moral stimuli aiming to break down the process of 
moral computations to see which types of information are first taken into consideration (Decety 
& Cacioppo, 2012). In this ERP study, participants responded to short, morally relevant visual 
clips of intentional and accidental harmful actions. Decety & Cacioppo (2012) found that 
perception of intentional harm, in comparison to accidental, was associated with better and faster 
reaction times. Perceiving intentional harm also seemed to specially recruit the right pSTS, the 
amygdala/temporal pole, and the vmPFC. In fact, perception of intentional and accidental harms 
was distinguished by high right pSTS involvement as soon as 62 milliseconds post-stimulus for 
intentional harm. These data suggest that intentionality is the first input into moral computations 
and judgments, especially within the harm domain (Decety & Cacioppo, 2012).  
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Additionally, Young et al. (2010) investigated another brain region thought to be 
important in inferring intentionality of an agent, the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ). When 
activity of the RTPJ was temporarily disrupted through transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), 
participants judged failed attempts to harm as more morally permissible and less morally 
forbidden than controls. These TMS participants seemed to be relying much less on the mental 
state of the agent in making moral judgments, as they did not consider the agent’s malicious 
intention and simply focused on the neutral outcome of the event.  
These two studies provide evidence for specific regions recruited and activated when 
distinguishing between intentional and accidental harm, but there is very little literature on neural 
recruitment for moral judgments of omission versus action. While there is a substantial literature 
on brain regions utilized in reasoning about the mental states (like intention) of an agent, an 
fMRI study on the neural recruitment of judgments of omission versus action would be 
immensely valuable to the field of moral psychology. The neuroscience research of processing 
omissions is in its infancy. Because subjects can readily articulate the action/omission distinction 
in their justifications and explanations of their moral judgments, it was initially hypothesized that 
the omission principle is available to conscious reasoning (Cushman et al., 2006), but recent 
fMRI findings seem to contradict this hypothesis. Cushman et al. (2011) investigated whether or 
not the omission bias is an automatic or controlled process and looked at the neural recruitment 
for omissions. They found that condemning harmful omissions is associated with frontoparietal 
control network activation, or that controlled cognition is associated with overriding the 
omission effect. This finding suggests that the omission bias is automatic and controlled 
cognition is necessary to overcome the automatic judgment.  
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The neuroscience of intentions and omissions during the process of making moral 
judgments is a promising area for future research. Importantly, this research would also help to 
confirm whether or not there are truly five psychologically distinct moral domains. If robust 
differences in brain activity emerge between harm and purity judgments, this finding would 
strongly support the notion that perceiving separate domains is not solely theoretical, but in fact 
demonstrates a true, psychological boundary in judging others and their moral transgressions. 
The question of how our moral judgments vary as a function of moral domains still remains and 
future research should aim to look more closely at how the neural recruitment of intentions and 
omissions differs for these decisions and judgments. Perhaps there are distinct neural bases for 
moral judgments of different domains.  
Cross-cultural implications 
 
 This study additionally provides solid foundation for future research applicable to cross-
cultural differences. How are the effects of intentionality and the omission bias are manifested 
differently in distinct populations around the world and how do they interact with cultural 
language norms? More broadly, how might these rules vary in a different culture and language, 
or might they have some universal applicability? Further, how do our moral judgments interact 
with human memory of events? Past research has demonstrated that fundamental linguistic 
differences can impact memory of events involving agents, or people perceived by others as 
having the capacity to make decisions and carry out actions, which can subsequently modify our 
judgments of their behavior (Fausey & Boroditsky, 2011; Fausey et al., 2010). For example, the 
use of the impersonal “se” in Spanish allows agents to be eliminated from the sentence, and is 
frequently utilized in cases of accidental actions when something was not intended (i.e. se 
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rompió el vaso). This particular linguistic style is not used in English and does not translate well. 
When speaking thus, it is more difficult to connect the accidental agent with the action.  
Fausey & Boroditsky (2011) found that while English and Spanish speakers did not differ 
in their memory for intentional agents, English speakers remembered accidental agents 
significantly better because in English, agentive language is used for both accidental and 
intentional transgressions and not just intentional ones like in Spanish. Similar results were 
obtained in a comparison between English and Japanese speakers (Fausey et al., 2010). Because 
Japanese also uses less agentive language for accidental agents, Japanese speakers remembered 
accidental agents significantly less well than English speakers. These findings can have 
tremendous implications for our eyewitness memory of events and for our moral judgments. 
These two studies demonstrate that language patterns are a contributor to moral cognition.  It 
seems that language can function as a top-down process over more general cognitive 
mechanisms. Because such linguistic preferences serve as basic cognitive processes, perhaps 
biases of omission and intentionality exert greater influence on the moral judgments of native 
Spanish and Japanese speakers such that outcomes of certain behaviors matter less. This kind of 
research will contribute to the scientific knowledge of moral judgments across domains with the 
additional consideration of cultural and linguistic variance, facilitating a better understanding of 
intentionality and the omission bias across cultures and linguistic styles.  
Conclusion 
Moral cognition is complex and many factors influence our judgments of others’ 
violations. The roles of intentionality and the omission bias differ across both moral judgments 
and domains, however this difference remains unclear for domains. Better understanding the 
influence of non-moral factors such as intentions and omissions on judgments of varying 
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transgressions will help to delineate the intricacies of morality and to determine the map of moral 
cognition. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS 
 
Liberals versus Conservatives  
 
We investigated the role of political orientation in making moral judgments based on 
previous research that the individualizing-binding distinction may account for the variation in 
moral concerns between right and left political wings (Graham et al., 2009). Harm and fairness 
have been found to be especially important and relevant to democrats and liberal morality, but 
the other domains don’t matter quite as much. Republicans, on the other hand, value a more 
conservative morality and endorse the “binding foundations” of ingroup, authority, and purity in 
addition to harm and fairness (Graham et al., 2009). All five domains are of equal weight and 
importance to conservatives. 
 In our analyses, we distinguished liberals from conservatives by averaging their three 
responses to the political orientation questions in the survey and then splitting near the median 
where there was a clear distinction. We ended up with 26 liberals and 24 conservatives. First, we 
ran two separate 2 (Wrongness, Punishment) x 2 (Intent, Action), one for liberals and one for 
conservatives. For the liberals 2 x 2, there were main effects of judgments (F(1,25) = 7.626, p < 
.05, partial eta squared = .234) and intent/action (F(1,25) = 95.022, p < .001, partial eta squared = 
.792). There was also an interaction between judgments and intent/action (F(1,25) = 18.321, p < 
.001, partial eta squared = .423). The conservatives 2 x 2 yielded similar results (F(1,23) = 
10.235, p < .01, partial eta squared = .308; F(1,23) = 122. 186, p < .001, partial eta squared = 
.842; interaction F(1,23) = 28.483, p < .001, partial eta squared = .553 respectively).  
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a)  b)  
Figure S1: a) Mean ratings of the difference between intentional and accidental transgressions 
and the difference between actions and omissions across judgments of wrongness and 
punishments for liberals and b) for conservatives. 
 
 While it looked like there might be a difference in the role of intent between liberals and 
conservatives, paired t-tests showed these trends were non-significant (p’s > .05). Two separate 5 
(Domains) x 2 (Intentional/Accidental) ANOVAS did not differ between political orientations. 
(Both liberals and conservatives showed main effects of domains (F(4,100) = 4.613, p < .01, 
partial eta squared = ; F(4,92) = 5.498, partial eta squared = .193 respectively) and intent/action 
(F(1,25) = 78.886, p < .001, partial eta squared = .759; F(1,23) = 107.824, p < .001, partial eta 
squared = .824 respectively). But in a 2 (Individualizing, Binding) x 2 (Intent, Action), there was 
a main effect of individualizing domains for liberals (F(1,25) = 12.176, p < .01, partial eta 
squared = .328) and not for conservatives (p = .073). (Both liberals and conservatives showed a 
main effect of intent/action here (F = 83.070, p < .001, partial eta squared = .769; F(1,23) = 
105.844, partial eta squared = .821 respectively).  
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Political orientation as a covariate  
When Action/Outcome scale, political orientation, and gender were entered as covariates 
for the 2 (Wrongness/Punishment) x 2 (Intentional/Accidental) ANOVA, the interaction 
remained, but the main effect of intentional/accidental was no longer significant.  
Similarly, when controlling for covariates in the 2 (Wrongness/Punishment) x 2 
(Action/Omission) ANOVA, nothing was significant (losing the main effect of action and the 
interaction between judgments and action/omission).   
Responsibility and Blame 
When exploring the role of action across domains for responsibility, paired t-tests 
revealed significant differences between harm and fairness (M = 1.01, SD = 2.425, t(49) = 2.945, 
p < .01), harm and ingroup (M = .860, SD = 2.703, t(49) = 2.250, p < .05), harm and authority 
(M = .860, SD = 1.648, t(49) = 3.691, p=.001), and fairness and purity (M = -.610, SD = 2.056, 
t(49) = -2.098, p < .05).  
 
Figure S2: Mean ratings of the difference between intentional and accidental transgressions 
across MFT domains for responsibility.  
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When judging the blameworthiness of transgressions, there were significant differences 
in the role of intent between harm and fairness (M = 1.23, SD = 2.139, t(49) = 4.067, p < .001), 
harm and ingroup (M = .860, SD = 2.515, t(49) = 2.418, p < .05), harm and authority (M = .930, 
SD = 1.675, t(49) = 3.926, p < .001), and harm and purity (M = .600, SD = 2.092, t(49) = 2.028, 
p < .05). Thus, intent mattered more for harm than any other domain. Fairness and purity also 
differed significantly (M = -.630, SD = 2.005, t(49) = -2.222, p < .05). For both responsibility 
and blame, fairness behaved surprisingly and differentiated from the harm domain.  
 
Figure S3: Mean ratings of the difference between intentional and accidental transgressions 
across MFT domains for blame.  
 
  When exploring the role of action across domains for responsibility, there were 
significant differences between harm and fairness (M = .810, SD = 1.971, t(49) = 2,905, p < .01), 
harm and authority (M = .600, SD = 1.457, t(49) = 2.912, p < .01), and harm and purity (M = 
1.08, SD = 2.237, t(49)= 3.414, p=.001). There were also significant differences between fairness 
and ingroup (M = -.590, SD = 1.971, t(49) = -2.117, p < .05), and ingroup and purity (M = .860, 
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SD = 2.879, t(49) = 2.113, p= < .05). The distinction between individualizing and binding 
foundations is especially unclear here.  
 
Figure S4: Mean ratings of the difference between actions and omissions across MFT domains 
for responsibility. 
 
The difference between action and omission across domains for blame only varied 
between harm and purity (marginal significance, M = .580, SD = 2.059, t(49) = 1.992, p = .052).  
 
Figure S5: Mean ratings of the difference between actions and omissions across MFT domains 
for blame.   
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APPENDIX I: STIMULI 
 
Harm 
 
John and Ivan are coworkers who decide to go to a restaurant for dinner after work one night. 
They discuss what to get and the waiter comes to take their order. Although Ivan is allergic to 
pepper, he doesn’t realize the salad he orders has pepper in the dressing. After eating the salad, 
Ivan is rushed to the emergency room with a severe allergic reaction.   
Intentional action: John knew about Ivan’s allergy and told him to order the salad with 
pepper. 
Accidental action: John did not know about Ivan’s allergy, so he told him to order the 
salad with pepper. 
Intentional omission: John knew about Ivan’s allergy and did not say anything when Ivan 
ordered the salad with pepper. 
Accidental omission: John did not know about Ivan’s allergy, so he did not say anything 
when Ivan ordered the salad with pepper. 
 
Erin and her new roommate, Sarah, are cleaning their kitchen together. Sarah is standing beside 
Erin telling a story while Erin is unloading the dishwasher. There is a long, sharp knife inside the 
dishwasher that ends up falling to the ground and cutting off one of Sarah’s toes. She screams 
out in pain. 
 Intentional action: When the knife was in Erin’s hand, she purposefully dropped it. 
 Accidental action: When the knife was in Erin’s hand, she accidentally dropped it. 
Intentional omission: The knife was sliding off a pile of dishes, and Erin could have 
easily stopped it. She noticed this happening, and she did nothing.  
Accidental omission: The knife was sliding off a pile of dishes, and Erin could have 
easily stopped it. She did not notice this happening, so she did nothing.  
 
Ted and his brother are playing basketball in their driveway. Ted’s brother is running around 
barefoot, despite Ted’s warning that he should put his shoes on. He ends up stepping on a nail 
and badly injuring his foot.  
Intentional action: Ted had the nail in his pocket and purposefully dropped it in the 
driveway to teach his brother a lesson. 
Accidental action: Ted had the nail in his pocket and did not mean to drop it in the 
driveway, hurting his brother. 
Intentional omission: Ted noticed the nail in the driveway and did not say anything to 
teach his brother a lesson. 
Accidental omission: Ted did not notice the nail in the driveway, so he did not say 
anything to his brother.  
 
 
Emma is volunteering at her local library. She’s standing on a ladder to look at the selection on a 
high shelf, and a stranger walks over to look at the books on the shelf below Emma. There is a 
box filled with heavy books sitting on the edge of the top shelf. The box ends up falling on the 
stranger and seriously hurting her. 
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Intentional action: Emma noticed this person was standing beneath her, and she 
purposefully knocked the box off the shelf.  
Accidental action: Emma did not notice this person was standing beneath her, and she 
accidentally knocked the box off the shelf. 
Intentional omission: The box began to fall off the shelf, and Emma could have prevented 
it from falling on this person. Emma noticed this happening and did nothing. 
Accidental omission:  The box began to fall off the shelf, and Emma could have 
prevented it from falling on this person. Emma did not notice this happening, so she did 
nothing. 
 
Fairness 
 
Kevin is hoping to sell his car and posts an ad online. The car is in poor condition, particularly 
the tires, which don’t hold pressure well and are about to go flat. A girl named Sally responds to 
Kevin’s post and comes to take a look at the car. Sally asks about the condition of the car and the 
tires and, after listening to Kevin’s response, decides to rent the car. Soon after, Sally gets a flat 
tire, and she is responsible for the cost. 
Intentional action: Kevin knew about the poor condition of the tires, but he lied to Sally, 
telling her that they were in good condition.  
Accidental action: Kevin did not know about the poor condition of the tires, so he told 
Sally that they were in good condition. 
Intentional omission: Kevin knew about the poor condition of the tires, but when 
answering Sally’s question, he did not mention the tires. 
Accidental omission: Kevin did not know about the poor condition of the tires, so when 
answering Sally’s question, he did not mention the tires. 
 
Karen works at a cashier's office and is organizing letters with Christmas bonuses for workers at 
her company. There are two bonuses people receive - large and small - based on the hours they 
work. Karen recognizes one of the names - an attractive person she met at a company party once. 
This person gets the large bonus in the mail even though he doesn’t work much at all and only 
deserves the small bonus.      
Intentional action: While reviewing the letters, Karen purposefully filed his letter 
incorrectly. 
Accidental action: While reviewing the letters, Karen did not mean to file his letter 
incorrectly.  
Intentional omission: While reviewing the letters, Karen noticed his letter was filed 
incorrectly and did not change it. 
Accidental omission: While reviewing the letters, Karen did not notice his letter was filed 
incorrectly so she did not change it. 
 
Mr. Carter is a high school history teacher. It’s the end of the semester, and he is in the process 
of assigning grades. Mr. Carter generally gets along well with his students except for one whom 
he doesn’t like very much. This particular student was failing the course, but she completed the 
extra credit assignment that will allow her to pass. She leaves the assignment on Mr. Carter’s 
desk just before the deadline. The extra credit score is not included in the final grade and Mr. 
Carter ends up failing her. 
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Intentional action: While cleaning out his desk, Mr. Carter noticed that she had turned in 
the assignment and purposefully threw it out. 
Accidental action: While cleaning out his desk, Mr. Carter did not notice that she had 
turned in the assignment and accidentally threw it out. 
Intentional omission: While cleaning out his desk, Mr. Carter noticed that her assignment 
had fallen into the trash, and he did not retrieve it.  
Accidental omission: While cleaning out his desk, Mr. Carter did not notice that her 
assignment had fallen into the trash, so he did not retrieve it.  
 
Ethan is a manager at a major corporation. A big mistake occurred in a recent project that is 
costing the company a lot of money. Andrea had been reporting to Ethan on the project. She is a 
very hard worker and has been an excellent asset to the company throughout her many years of 
working there. Sometimes, Ethan and Andrea had heated disagreements while discussing the 
project. Another person was responsible for the big mistake, and Andrea’s work had nothing to 
do with it. There is a list of people to be fired. Andrea is fired even though the problem with the 
project was not her fault.   
Intentional action: Ethan knew that the mistake was not Andrea’s fault, and he added her 
name to the list of people to be fired. 
Accidental action: Ethan did not know that the mistake was not Andrea’s fault, so he 
added her name to the list of people to be fired. 
Intentional omission: Ethan knew that the mistake was not Andrea’s fault. When he saw 
her name on the list of people to be fired, he did not remove it.  
Accidental omission: Ethan did not know that the mistake was not Andrea’s fault. When 
he saw her name on the list of people to be fired, he did not remove it.  
 
Ingroup 
 
Jack, an American, loves to travel. He goes abroad and decides to go backpacking across Asia. 
One day, he is walking along a crowded, popular shopping street in the city he is currently 
visiting. Jack encounters an American flag hanging near one of the store entrances. The flag ends 
up on the ground. Many of the locals observe this situation. 
Intentional action: Jack was feeling particularly anti-American, so he purposefully threw 
the flag on the ground.  
Accidental action: In a hurry, Jack accidentally bumped into the flag, causing it to fall to 
the ground. 
Intentional omission: The flag was falling to the ground. Jack was feeling particularly 
anti-American, so he watched the flag fall and purposefully left it there. 
Accidental omission: The flag was falling to the ground. In a hurry, Jack did not notice 
the flag land on the ground, so he accidentally left it there. 
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Jason is the friend of Patrick, a political candidate running for senator in the upcoming election. 
Jason has had second thoughts lately and doesn’t think that Patrick should be in the running. 
They are at a restaurant talking. Jason knows Patrick was recently involved in an event that 
would seriously hurt his campaign. Patrick begins telling Jason about this event. There is a 
reporter close by in the room that overhears their conversation and publishes the whole incident, 
resulting in Patrick being removed from candidacy. 
Intentional action: Jason noticed that there was a reporter listening to their conversation, 
and he insisted that Patrick tell him everything about the event. 
Accidental action: Jason did not notice that there was a reporter listening to their 
conversation, so he insisted that Patrick tell him everything about the event. 
Intentional omission: Jason noticed that there was a reporter listening to their 
conversation, and he did not stop Patrick from telling him about the event. 
Accidental omission: Jason did not notice that there was a reporter listening to their 
conversation, so he did not stop Patrick from telling him about the event. 
 
Michael is at his friend's party. His friend wants to introduce Michael to a girl he is good friends 
with. They spot the girl across the room, and they go over to meet her. Michael instantly gets 
along with the girl, and later that night they kiss and plan to go out on a date. Michael's friend 
really wanted to date the girl and was going to ask her out the very next day.  
Intentional action: Michael knew his friend wanted to date the girl, but he kissed her 
anyway. 
Accidental action: Michael did not know his friend wanted to date the girl, so he kissed 
her. 
Intentional omission: Michael knew his friend wanted to date the girl, but when she 
kissed him, he did not stop her.  
Accidental omission: Michael did not know his friend wanted to date the girl, so when 
she kissed him, he did not stop her. 
 
Emily and Lauren are teammates on their high school field hockey team. Emily has always been 
jealous of Lauren, who is the best player. The school’s policy is that students on probation may 
not participate in sport competitions. Lauren has been on academic probation, but is cleared just 
in time for the team’s biggest game of the season against the school's greatest rivals. An 
administrator asks Emily to give her coach an envelope containing a message that says Lauren is 
allowed to play, but her coach never receives this message.  Lauren is not allowed to play in the 
game, and without Lauren’s presence, her team loses badly to their rivals.      
Intentional action: Emily purposefully delivered the envelope to the wrong mailbox in the 
teacher’s lounge.  
Accidental action: Emily accidentally delivered the envelope to the wrong mailbox in the 
teacher’s lounge.  
Intentional omission: Emily knew the envelope contained the message about Lauren, and 
she failed to deliver the message before the game.  
Accidental omission: Emily did not know the envelope contained the message about 
Lauren, and she failed to deliver the message before the game. 
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Authority 
 
Rachel’s grandmother spent hours knitting Rachel a sweater for her birthday and asks Rachel to 
wear it to the family reunion next weekend. Before the reunion, the sweater gets washed. The 
sweater should only be hand-washed, so it shrinks to the point that Rachel can no longer wear it.   
Intentional action: Rachel threw the sweater in the wash. She knew the sweater was hand-
wash only, but purposefully shrunk the sweater so she no longer has to wear it. 
Accidental action: Rachel threw the sweater in the wash. She did not know the sweater 
was hand-wash only, and did not mean to shrink the sweater. 
Intentional omission: Rachel noticed the sweater was in the wash, and did not remove it. 
She knew the sweater was hand-wash only, but purposefully let the sweater shrink so she 
no longer has to wear it. 
Accidental omission: Rachel noticed the sweater was in the wash, and did not remove it. 
She did not know the sweater was hand-wash only, and did not mean to let the sweater 
shrink.   
 
A school is celebrating its 100th anniversary and the student council president, Kim, has been 
assigned to present a slideshow of videos to the school throughout the day. Mr. Harris, the school 
principal, is looking forward to the celebration. During the slideshow presentation, a very 
embarrassing video of Mr. Harris is also screened and he is clearly offended.  
Intentional action: While reviewing the slides, Kim purposefully added the video of Mr. 
Harris to the presentation. 
Accidental action: While reviewing the slides, Kim accidentally added the video of Mr. 
Harris to the presentation. 
Intentional omission: While reviewing the slides, Kim noticed the video of Mr. Harris in 
the presentation and did not remove it. 
Accidental omission: While reviewing the slides, Kim did not notice the video of Mr. 
Harris in the presentation, so she did not remove it.  
 
Jeff’s father is preparing a major presentation for work on his computer and goes upstairs 
without saving his progress. While his father is upstairs, Jeff uses his computer. A message pops 
up that says an automatic software update is about to begin in one minute and the update will be 
complete after the computer restarts. The message also warns that unsaved data will be lost. 
There are two options on the message: “Restart computer” and “Cancel”. The one-minute timer 
begins to tick down, and if it expires, the computer will restart on its own. The presentation gets 
deleted and Jeff’s father is completely humiliated in front of his boss and coworkers when he 
arrives at work. 
Intentional action: Jeff knew that his father had not saved the presentation, and he clicked 
the “Restart computer” option.  
Accidental action: Jeff did not know that his father had not saved the presentation, and he 
clicked the “Restart computer” option. 
Intentional omission: Jeff knew that his father had not saved the presentation. He easily 
could have clicked the “Cancel” option, but instead, Jeff did nothing and allowed the 
timer to expire.  
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Accidental omission: Jeff did not know that his father had not saved the presentation. He 
easily could have clicked the “Cancel” option, but instead, Jeff did nothing and allowed 
the timer to expire. 
Kelly’s Great Aunt Ethel is in charge of running a fundraising event, and there is pressure for her 
to raise a certain amount of money. Great Aunt Ethel expects Kelly to help out and asks her to 
put up flyers promoting the event around town. Later that day, Kelly decides to clean and 
organize her room. The flyers for Great Aunt Ethel’s event end up in the trash. 
Intentional action: Kelly noticed her Great Aunt Ethel’s flyers were in a large stack of 
paper, and she threw the stack out. 
Accidental action: Kelly did not notice her Great Aunt Ethel’s flyers were in a large stack 
of paper, so she threw the stack out. 
Intentional omission: Kelly noticed her Great Aunt Ethel’s flyers had fallen into the trash, 
and she did not retrieve them. 
Accidental omission: Kelly did not notice her Great Aunt Ethel’s flyers had fallen into 
the trash, so she did not retrieve them. 
 
Purity 
 
Mark and his friends are out celebrating for the evening. After they finish dinner, they leave the 
restaurant and discuss what to do next. As they are walking, they pass a strip club and decide to 
go in for a few dances. Mark's daughter, Julie, is a dancer at the strip club and is performing that 
night when they go in. 
Intentional action: Mark knew his daughter worked at the strip club, and he suggested it 
would be a great place to go next. 
Accidental action: Mark did not know his daughter worked at the strip club when he 
suggested it would be a great place to go next. 
Intentional omission: Mark knew his daughter worked at the strip club, and when his 
friends suggested they go, he did not suggest an alternative. 
Accidental omission: Mark did not know his daughter worked at the strip club, and when 
his friends suggested they go there, he did not suggest an alternative. 
 
Eric recently started chatting with someone in an online chat community. They live on opposite 
coasts, but they have been chatting nightly for weeks now. One night, Eric’s cyber friend 
performs sexual acts for him. Eric’s cyber friend is his older sibling.  
Intentional action: Eric asked her to perform sexual acts. The camera shots were of the 
full person, so Eric knew it was his sibling. 
Accidental action: Eric asked her to perform sexual acts. The camera shots were of the 
body only, so Eric did not know it was his sibling. 
Intentional omission: Eric’s cyber friend began performing sexual acts, and Eric did not 
stop her. The camera shots were of the full person, so Eric knew it was his sibling.  
Accidental omission: Eric’s cyber friend began performing sexual acts, and Eric did not 
stop her. The camera shots were of the body only, so Eric did not know it was his sibling. 
 
Maria is in the middle of cleaning her basement. She is feeling dehydrated and brings a glass of 
water down to the basement with her. Maria sets the glass of water on the floor. There are a lot of 
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cobwebs and spiders around the basement and Maria has a lot of dusting to do. After awhile, she 
takes a break to drink some water. Maria swallows a spider while taking a sip.  
Intentional action: While dusting, Maria purposefully knocked the spider into her glass of 
water before drinking it. 
Accidental action: While dusting, Maria accidentally knocked the spider into her glass of 
water before drinking it. 
Intentional omission: While drinking, Maria noticed the spider in her water, but she did 
not remove it and kept drinking anyway. 
Accidental omission: While drinking, Maria did not notice the spider in her water, so she 
did not remove it and kept drinking anyway.  
 
Kyle is preparing dinner for his friends at his house. He recently cut his finger with a sharp knife 
while chopping vegetables, and he still has a Band-Aid on the injured finger, but it is loosely 
attached. Kyle finishes preparing the entrée and a side soup, and he and his guests sit down for 
dinner. The bloody Band-Aid ends up in his side soup, and Kyle eats the soup and swallows the 
Band-Aid. 
Intentional action: Kyle took off the bloody Band-Aid and purposefully dropped it in his 
side soup. 
Accidental action: Kyle took off the bloody Band-Aid, but did not mean to drop it in his 
side soup. 
Intentional omission: Kyle’s bloody Band-Aid fell into his side soup. He noticed the 
Band-Aid floating in his soup, and he continued eating it.  
Accidental omission: Kyle’s bloody Band-Aid fell into his side soup. He did not notice 
the Band-Aid floating in his soup, so he continued eating it. 
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APPENDIX II: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE (Graham et al., 2011) 
 
Part I: Moral Relevance  
 
Participants were asked, “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent 
are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?”.  They responded according to the 
following scale: 0 - not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments 
of right and wrong), 1 - not very relevant, 2 - slightly relevant, 3 - somewhat relevant, 4 - very 
relevant, 5 - extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and 
wrong). 
 
Harm items: 
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally 
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
Whether or not someone was cruel 
 
Fairness items: 
Whether or not some people were treated differently from others 
Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
 
Ingroup items: 
Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country 
Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group 
Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 
 
Authority items: 
Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority 
Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society 
Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 
 
Purity items: 
Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
Whether or not someone did something disgusting 
Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of 
 
Control item: 
Whether or not someone was good at math 
 
Part II: Moral Judgments 
Participants were asked to read the following sentences and to indicate their agreement or 
disagreement according to the following scale: 0 - strongly disagree, 1 - moderately disagree, 2 - 
slightly disagree, 3 - slightly agree, 4 - moderately agree, 5 - strongly agree. 
 
Harm items: 
Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. 
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One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal.  
It can never be right to kill a human being. 
 
Fairness items: 
When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is 
treated fairly. 
Justice is the most important requirement for a society. 
I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit 
nothing. 
 
Ingroup items: 
I am proud of my country’s history. 
People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong.  
It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. 
 
Authority items: 
Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. 
Men and women each have different roles to play in society. 
If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey anyway 
because that is my duty. 
 
Purity items: 
People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed. 
I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. 
Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. 
 
Control item: 
It is better to do good than to do bad.  
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APPENDIX III: THE ACTION/OUTCOME SCALE (Miller et al., in press) 
 
Participants were asked, “How much would it upset you to…?” and responded on a scale from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very much so).  
 
Action Items: 
Hold an empty gun that both you and your friend know is empty to your friend's head and pull 
the trigger.  
Curse angrily at an old woman as part of a movie script.  
Hit the hand of a corpse with a hammer. 
Yell derogatory remarks at your mother on the phone while holding down the mute button.  
Make obscene gestures directed at your best friend behind their back.  
Stab a fellow actor in the neck during a play using a stage knife with a retractable blade. 
Volunteer to "saw a woman in half" as part of a realistic but safe magic trick. 
Cut open a patient's stomach during a necessary medical procedure.  
Shoot a bullet at a consenting friend while he's behind a bulletproof glass. 
 
Outcome Items: 
See a stranger fall down the stairs.  
Listen to somebody have a tooth pulled when there is no anesthetic available.  
See a chef cut their finger by accident.  
See footage of a person drowning on the evening news.  
See a football player break his leg during a game.  
See someone shut their own finger in a car door.  
Hear the cries of an injured boy who has fallen off his bike.  
See a painter fall off of a ladder.  
See someone step barefoot on broken shards of glass.  
See a man accidentally spill boiling water on his hand.  
See a woman in sandals accidentally get her toes run over by a shopping cart.  
Watch a boy experience an allergic reaction after eating peanuts.  
Hear a frightened child crying.  
See a woman crying after a painful medical operation. 
 
Control Items: 
Hear the birthday song 100 times in a row.  
Lose your home to a fire.  
Find a moth hole on your favorite shirt.  
Get a flat tire on the way to your wedding.  
Learn that you only have one hour to study for a difficult final exam.  
Lose electrical power to your home for a day. 
Accidentally break your favorite coffee mug.  
Lose your cell phone.  
Have to wait three hours in the waiting room at the doctor’s office.  
Drop a cake you made for your grandmother while taking it to her house.  
Get caught in the rain at the park after planning a nice picnic for your family. 
